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Abstract
A key tool for building differentially private systems is adding Gaussian noise to the output
of a function evaluated on a sensitive dataset. Unfortunately, using a continuous distribution
presents several practical challenges. First and foremost, finite computers cannot exactly repre-
sent samples from continuous distributions, and previous work has demonstrated that seemingly
innocuous numerical errors can entirely destroy privacy. Moreover, when the underlying data
is itself discrete (e.g., population counts), adding continuous noise makes the result less inter-
pretable.
With these shortcomings in mind, we introduce and analyze the discrete Gaussian in the
context of differential privacy. Specifically, we theoretically and experimentally show that adding
discrete Gaussian noise provides essentially the same privacy and accuracy guarantees as the
addition of continuous Gaussian noise. We also present an simple and efficient algorithm for
exact sampling from this distribution. This demonstrates its applicability for privately answering
counting queries, or more generally, low-sensitivity integer-valued queries.
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1 Introduction
Differential Privacy [DMNS06] provides a rigorous standard for ensuring that the output of an
algorithm does not leak the private details of individuals contained in its input. A standard
technique for ensuring differential privacy is to evaluate a function on the input and then add
a small amount of random noise to the result before releasing it. Specifically, it is common to add
noise drawn from a Laplace or Gaussian distribution, which is scaled according to the sensitivity
of the function – i.e., how much one person’s data can change the function value. These are two of
the most fundamental algorithms in differential privacy, which are used as subroutines in almost all
differentially private systems. For example, differentially private algorithms for convex empirical
risk minimization and deep learning are based on adding noise to gradients [BST14; ACGMMTZ16].
However, the Laplace and Gaussian distributions are both continuous over the real numbers. As
such, it is not possible to even represent a sample from them on a finite computer, much less produce
such a sample. One might suppose that such issues are purely of theoretical interest, and that they
can be resolved in practice by simply using standard floating-point arithmetic and representations.
Unfortunately, this is not the case: Mironov [Mir12] demonstrated that the na¨ıve use of finite-
precision approximations can result in catastrophic failures of privacy. In particular, by examining
the low-order bits of the noisy output, the noiseless value can often be determined. Mironov
demonstrated that this information allows the entire input dataset can be rapidly reconstructed,
while only a negligible privacy loss is recorded by the system. Despite this demonstration, the flawed
methods continue to appear in open source implementations of differentially private mechanisms
[Cen18; Dif19; Goo20; Whi20]. This demonstrates a real need for us to provide safe and practical
solutions to enable the deployment of differentially private systems in real-world privacy-critical
settings. In this work, we carefully consider how to securely implement these basic differentially
private methods on finite computers that cannot faithfully represent real numbers.
One solution to this problem involves instead sampling from a discrete distribution that can be
sampled on a finite computer. For many natural queries, the output of the function to be computed
is naturally discrete – e.g., counting how many records in a dataset satisfy some predicate – and
hence there is no loss in accuracy when adding discrete noise to it. Otherwise, the function value
must be rounded before adding noise.
The discrete Laplace distribution (a.k.a. two-sided geometric distribution) [GRS12; BV17] is the
natural discrete analogue of the continuous Laplace distribution. That is, instead of a probability
density of ε2 · e−ε|x| at x ∈ R we have a probability mass of e
ε−1
eε+1 · e−ε|x| at x ∈ Z. Akin to its
continuous counterpart, the discrete Laplace distribution provides pure (ε, 0)-differential privacy
and has many other desirable properties. Notably, the discrete Laplace distribution is used in the
TopDown algorithm being developed to protect the data collected in the 2020 US Census [KCKHM18;
Abo18; Cen18].
The (continuous) Gaussian distribution has many advantages over the (continuous) Laplace
distribution (and also some disadvantages), making it better suited for many applications. For
example, the Gaussian distribution has lighter tails than the Laplace distribution. In settings with
a high degree of composition – i.e., answering many queries with independent noise, rather than a
single query – the scale (e.g., variance) of Gaussian noise is also lower than the scale of Laplace noise
required for a comparable privacy guarantee. The privacy analysis under composition of Gaussian
noise addition is typically simpler and sharper; in particular, these privacy guarantees can be cleanly
expressed in terms of concentrated differential privacy (CDP) [DR16; BS16] and related variants of
differential privacy [Mir17; BDRS18; DRS19]. (See Section 4 for further discussion.)
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Thus, it is natural to wonder whether a discretization of the Gaussian distribution retains the
privacy and utility properties of the continuous Gaussian distribution, as is the case for the Laplace
distribution. In this paper, we show that this is indeed the case.
Definition 1 (Discrete Gaussian). Let µ, σ ∈ R with σ > 0. The discrete Gaussian distribution
with location µ and scale σ is denoted NZ
(
µ, σ2
)
. It is a probability distribution supported on the
integers and defined by
∀x ∈ Z, P
X←NZ(µ,σ2)
[X = x] =
e−(x−µ)2/2σ2∑
y∈Z e−(y−µ)
2/2σ2
. (1)
Note that we exclusively consider µ ∈ Z; in this case, the distribution is symmetric and centered
at µ. This is the natural discrete analogue of the continuous Gaussian (which has density 1√
2piσ2
·
e−(x−µ)2/2σ2 at x ∈ R), and it arises in lattice-based cryptography (in a multivariate form, which
is believed to be hard to sample from) [GPV08; Reg09; Pei10; Ste17, etc.].
1.1 Results
Our investigations focus on three aspects of the discrete Gaussian: privacy, utility, and sampling. In
summary, we demonstrate that the discrete Gaussian provides the same level of privacy and utility
as the continuous Gaussian. We also show that it can be efficiently sampled on a finite computer,
thus addressing the shortcomings of continuous distributions discussed earlier. Along the way, we
both prove and empirically demonstrate a number of additional properties of the discrete Gaussian
of interest and useful to those deploying it for privacy purposes (and even otherwise). We proceed
to elaborate on our contributions and findings.
Privacy. The discrete Gaussian enjoys privacy guarantees which are almost identical to those
of the continuous Gaussian. More precisely, in Theorem 4, we show that adding noise drawn
from NZ
(
0, 1/ε2
)
to an integer-valued sensitivity-1 query (e.g., a counting query) provides 12ε
2-
concentrated differential privacy. This is the same guarantee attained by adding a draw from
N (0, 1/ε2). Furthermore, in Theorem 7, we provide tight bounds on the discrete Gaussian’s ap-
proximate differential privacy guarantees. For large scales σ, the discrete and continuous Gaussian
have virtually the same privacy guarantee, although for smaller σ, the effects of discretization result
in one or the other having marginally stronger privacy (depending on the parameters). Along the
way, we develop new tools for converting concentrated differential privacy guarantees into approx-
imate differential privacy guarantees, which are not specific to the discrete Gaussian and are of
independent interest. Our results on privacy are presented in Section 2.
Utility. The discrete Gaussian attains the same or slightly better accuracy as the analogous
continuous Gaussian. Specifically, Corollary 15 shows that the variance of NZ
(
0, σ2
)
is at most σ2,
and that it also satisfies sub-Gaussian tail bounds comparable to N (0, σ2). We show numerically
that the discrete Gaussian is better than rounding the continuous Gaussian to an integral value.
Our results on utility are provided in Section 3.
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Sampling. We can practically sample a discrete Gaussian on a finite computer. We present a sim-
ple and efficient exact sampling procedure that only requires access to uniformly random bits and
does not involve any real-arithmetic operations or non-trivial function evaluations (Algorithm 3).
As there are previous methods which are more computationally efficient (see, e.g., Karney’s algo-
rithm [Kar16], which was an inspiration for our work), we do not consider this to be one of our
primary contributions. Nonetheless, we include these results as we consider our methods to be
simpler, and in order to make our paper self-contained. Our results on how to sample are provided
in Section 5.
We provide a thorough comparison between the discrete Gaussian and the discrete Laplace
distribution in Section 4. This includes statements of the privacy and utility guarantees for the
discrete Laplace, and discussing its performance under composition in depth.
On a technical note, while the takeaway of many of our conclusions is that the discrete and
continuous Gaussian are qualitatively similar, we comment that such statements are non-trivial
to prove, in particular relying upon methods such as the Poisson summation formula and Fourier
analysis. For instance, even basic statements on the stability property of Gaussians under linear
combinations do not hold for the discrete counterpart, with their approximate versions being highly
involved to establish (see, e.g., [AR16]).
1.2 Related Work
As originally observed and demonstrated by Mironov [Mir12], na¨ıve implementations of the Laplace
mechanism with floating-point arithmetic blatantly fail to ensure differential privacy, or any form
of privacy at all. As a remedy, Mironov introduced the snapping mechanism, which serves as a
safe replacement for the Laplace mechanism in the floating-point setting. The snapping mechanism
performs rounding and truncation on top of the floating-point arithmetic. However, properly imple-
menting and analyzing the snapping mechanism can be involved [Cov19], due to the idiosyncrasies
of floating-point arithmetic. Furthermore, the snapping mechanism requires a compromise on pri-
vacy and accuracy, relative to what is theoretically achievable. Our methods avoid floating-point
arithmetic entirely and do not compromise the privacy or accuracy guarantees.
Gazeau, Miller, and Palamidessi [GMP16] gave an alternate and more general analysis of
Mironov’s approach of rounding the output of an inexact sampling procedure.
Ghosh, Roughgarden, and Sundararajan [GRS12] proposed and analyzed a discrete version of
the Laplace mechanism, which is also private on finite computers. However, this has heavier tails
than the Gaussian and requires the addition of more noise (i.e., higher variance) than the Gaussian
in setting with a high degree of composition (i.e., many queries). We provide a detailed comparison
in Section 4. The US Census Bureau is planning to to protect the data collected in the 2020 US
Census using discrete Laplace noise [KCKHM18; Abo18]. However, their prototype implementation
[Cen18] does not use an exact sampling procedure.
Perhaps the closest distribution to the discrete Gaussian that has been considered for differ-
ential privacy is the Binomial distribution. Dwork, Kenthapadi, McSherry, Mironov, and Naor
[DKMMN06] gave a differential privacy analysis of Binomial noise addition, which was improved
by Agarwal, Suresh, Yu, Kumar, and McMahan [ASYKM18].1 The advantage of the Binomial is
that it is amenable to distributed generation – i.e., a sum of Binomials with the same bias param-
1 Dinur and Nissim [DN03] also analyzed the privacy properties of Binomial noise addition, but this predates the
definition of differential privacy, so they work with a different definition.
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eter is also Binomial. The disadvantage of Binomial noise addition, however, is that its privacy
analysis is quite involved. One inherent reason for this is that the analysis must compare the
Binomial to a shifted Binomial, and these distributions have different supports. If the observed
output y is in the support of M(x) but not of M(x′) (i.e., P [M(x′) = y] = 0), then the privacy
loss is infinite; this failure probability must be accounted for by the δ parameter of approximate
(ε, δ)-differential privacy. In other words, the Binomial mechanism is inherently an approximate
differential privacy one (in comparison to the stronger concentrated differential privacy attainable
by the discrete Gaussian). For large values of n, Binomial(n, p) provides guarantees comparable to
N (0, np(1− p)) or NZ (0, np(1− p)). This matches the intuition, since Binomial(n, p) converges to
a Gaussian as n→∞ by the central limit theorem.
Going beyond noise addition, it has been shown that private histograms [BV17] and selection
(i.e., the exponential mechanism) [Ilv19] can be implemented on finite computers. (Both of these
results are for pure (ε, 0)-differential privacy.)
To the best of our knowledge, there has been no work on implementing an analogue of Gaussian
noise addition on finite computers. An obvious approach would be to round the output of some
inexact sampling procedure. Properly analyzing this may be difficult, due to the fact that the
underlying inexact Gaussian sampling procedure will be more complex than the equivalent for
Laplace. Furthermore, in Section 3, we show empirically that our approach yields better utility
than rounding.
In Proposition 12 and Corollary 13, we give a conversion from Re´nyi and concentrated dif-
ferential privacy to approximate differential privacy. Asoodeh, Liao, Calmon, Kosut, and Sankar
[ALCKS20] provide an optimal conversion from Re´nyi differential privacy to approximate differ-
ential privacy. Their result is tighter than ours (but only slightly) at the expense of being more
complicated and less numerically stable. See Section 2.3.
Another of our secondary contributions is a simple and efficient method for sampling from a
discrete Gaussian or discrete Laplace; see Section 5. Karney [Kar16] also provides such algorithms.
We consider our method to be simpler. In particular, our method keeps all arithmetic within the
integers or the rational numbers, where exact arithmetic is possible. In contrast, Karney’s method
still involves representing real numbers, but this can be carefully implemented on a finite computer
using a flexible level of precision and lazy evaluation – that is, although a uniform sample from
[0, 1] requires an infinite number of bits to represent, only a finite (but a priori unbounded) number
of these bits are actually needed and these can be sampled when needed. There are also methods
for approximate sampling [ZSS19], but our interest is in exact sampling.
Finally, we remark that (a multivariate version of) the discrete Gaussian has been extensively
studied in the context of lattice-based cryptography [GPV08; Reg09; Pei10; Ste17, etc.].
2 Privacy
For completeness, we state the definitions of differential privacy [DMNS06; DKMMN06] and con-
centrated differential privacy [DR16; BS16].
Definition 2 (Pure/Approximate Differential Privacy). A randomized algorithm M : X n → Y
satisfies (ε, δ)-differential privacy if, for all x, x′ ∈ X n differing on a single element and all events
E ⊂ Y, we have P [M(x) ∈ E] ≤ eε · P [M(x′) ∈ E] + δ.
The special case of (ε, 0)-differential privacy is referred to as pure or pointwise ε-differential
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privacy, whereas, for δ > 0, (ε, δ)-differential privacy is referred to as approximate differential
privacy.
Definition 3 (Concentrated Differential Privacy). A randomized algorithm M : X n → Y satisfies
1
2ε
2-concentrated differential privacy if, for all x, x′ ∈ X n differing on a single element and all
α ∈ (1,∞), we have Dα (M(x)‖M(x′)) ≤ 12ε2α, where Dα (P‖Q) = 1α−1 log
(∑
y∈Y P (y)
αQ(y)1−α
)
is the Re´nyi divergence of order α of the distribution P from the distribution Q.2
Note that (ε, 0)-differential privacy implies 12ε
2-concentrated differential privacy and 12ε
2-concentrated
differential privacy implies
(
1
2ε
2 + ε ·√2 log(1/δ), δ)-differential privacy for all δ > 0 [BS16].
2.1 Concentrated Differential Privacy
In this section, we prove our main result on concentrated differential privacy (CDP), showing that
the discrete Gaussian provides the same CDP guarantees as the continuous one.
Theorem 4 (Discrete Gaussian Satisfies Concentrated Differential Privacy). Let ∆, ε > 0. Let
q : X n → Z satisfy |q(x) − q(x′)| ≤ ∆ for all x, x′ ∈ X n differing on a single entry. Define a
randomized algorithm M : X n → Z by M(x) = q(x) + Y where Y ← NZ
(
0,∆2/ε2
)
. Then M
satisfies 12ε
2-concentrated differential privacy.
Theorem 4 follows from Proposition 5 and Definition 3 .
Proposition 5. Let σ, α ∈ R with σ > 0 and α ≥ 1. Let µ, ν ∈ Z. Then
Dα
(NZ (µ, σ2)∥∥NZ (ν, σ2)) ≤ (µ− ν)2
2σ2
· α. (2)
Furthermore, this inequality is an equality whenever α · (µ− ν) is an integer.
It is worth noting that the continuous Gaussian satisfies the same concentrated differential pri-
vacy bound, with equality for all Re´nyi divergence parameters: Dα
(N (µ, σ2)∥∥N (ν, σ2)) = (µ−ν)2
2σ2
·α
for all α, µ, ν, σ ∈ R with σ > 0. Thus we see that the privacy guarantee of the discrete Gaussian
is essentially identical to that of the continuous Gaussian with the same parameters. To prove
Proposition 5, we use the following well-known (e.g., [Reg09]) technical lemma.
Lemma 6. Let µ, σ ∈ R with σ > 0. Then∑
x∈Z
e−(x−µ)
2/2σ2 ≤
∑
x∈Z
e−x
2/2σ2 . (3)
Proof. Let f : R→ R be defined by f(x) = e−x2/2σ2 . Define its Fourier transform fˆ : R→ R by
fˆ(y) =
∫
R
f(x)e−2pi
√−1xydx =
√
2piσ2 · e−2pi2σ2y2 .
By the Poisson summation formula [Poi; Wei], for every t ∈ R, we have∑
x∈Z
f(x+ t) =
∑
y∈Z
fˆ(y) · e2pi
√−1yt.
2We take log to be the natural logarithm – i.e., base e ≈ 2.718.
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(This is the Fourier series representation of the 1-periodic function g : R → R given by g(t) =∑
x∈Z e
−(x+t)2/2σ2 .) In particular, f(x) > 0 and fˆ(x) > 0 for all x ∈ R. From this and the triangle
inequality, we get
∑
x∈Z
e−(x−µ)/2σ
2
=
∑
x∈Z
f(x− µ) =
∣∣∣∣∣∑
x∈Z
f(x− µ)
∣∣∣∣∣ =
∣∣∣∣∣∣
∑
y∈Z
fˆ(y)e−2pi
√−1yµ
∣∣∣∣∣∣
≤
∑
y∈Z
∣∣∣fˆ(y)e−2pi√−1yµ∣∣∣ = ∑
y∈Z
fˆ(y) =
∑
x∈Z
f(x) =
∑
x∈Z
e−x
2/2σ2 ,
proving the lemma.
Proof of Proposition 5. Without loss of generality, ν = 0 and α > 1. Recalling that µ ∈ Z, we have
e(α−1)Dα(NZ(µ,σ
2)‖NZ(0,σ2)) =
∑
x∈Z
P
X←NZ(µ,σ2)
[X = x]α · P
X←NZ(0,σ2)
[X = x]1−α
=
∑
x∈Z
(
e−(x−µ)2/2σ2∑
y∈Z e−(y−µ)
2/2σ2
)α
·
(
e−x2/2σ2∑
y∈Z e−y
2/2σ2
)1−α
=
∑
x∈Z exp
(
−x2+2αµx−αµ2
2σ2
)
∑
y∈Z e−y
2/2σ2
= eα(α−1)µ
2/2σ2 ·
∑
x∈Z e
−(x−αµ)2/2σ2∑
y∈Z e−y
2/2σ2
≤ eα(α−1)µ2/2σ2 ,
where the final inequality follows from Lemma 6. The inequality is an equality when αµ ∈ Z.
2.2 Approximate Differential Privacy
In this section, we prove our main result on approximate differential privacy; namely, a tight bound
on the privacy parameters achieved by the discrete Gaussian.
Theorem 7 (Discrete Gaussian Satisfies Approximate Differential Privacy). Let ∆, σ, ε > 0. Let
q : X n → Z satisfy |q(x) − q(x′)| ≤ ∆ for all x, x′ ∈ X n differing on a single entry. Define a
randomized algorithm M : X n → Z by M(x) = q(x) + Y where Y ← NZ
(
0, σ2
)
. Then M satisfies
(ε, δ)-differential privacy for
δ = P
Y←NZ(0,σ2)
[
Y >
εσ2
∆
− ∆
2
]
− eε · P
Y←NZ(0,σ2)
[
Y >
εσ2
∆
+
∆
2
]
. (4)
Furthermore, this is the smallest possible value of δ for which this is true.
This privacy guarantee is analogous to that of the continuous Gaussian: If we replace all occurrences
of the discrete Gaussian with the continuous Gaussian above, then the same result holds [BW18,
Thm. 8].Empirically, these guarantees are very close.
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We also provide some analytic upper bounds (proofs can be found at the end of this section):
First, for ∆ = 1 we have δ ≤ e−bεσ2e2/2σ2/
√
2piσ2, where b·e denotes rounding to the nearest integer.
Furthermore, if ε > ∆
2
2σ2
and εσ
2
∆ ± ∆2 /∈ N, then
δ ≤ P
X←N (0,σ2)
[
X >
⌊
εσ2
∆
− ∆
2
⌋]
−
(
1− 1√
2piσ2 + 1
)
eε P
X←N (0,σ2)
[
X >
⌊
εσ2
∆
+
∆
2
⌋]
. (5)
In Figure 1, we empirically compare the optimal δ (given by Theorem 7) to the bound attained by
the corresponding continuous Gaussian, as well as this analytic upper bound (5), the standard upper
bound entailed by concentrated differential privacy, and an improved upper bound via concentrated
differential privacy (Corollary 13). We see that the upper bounds are reasonably tight. The discrete
and continuous Gaussian attain almost identical guarantees for large σ, but the discretization
creates a small difference that becomes apparent for small σ.
Figure 1: Comparison of approximate (ε, δ)-differential privacy guarantees (δ as a function of ε).
To prove Theorem 7, we introduce the privacy loss random variable [DRV10; DR16; BS16] and
relate it to approximate differential privacy.3
Definition 8 (Privacy Loss Random Variable). Let M : X n → Y be a randomized algorithm. Let
x, x′ ∈ X n be neighbouring inputs. Define f : Y → R by f(y) = log
(
P[M(x)=y]
P[M(x′)=y]
)
. (More formally,
f is the logarithm of the Radon-Nikodym derivative of the distribution of M(x) with respect to
the distribution of M(x′). If the distribution of M(x) is not absolutely continuous with respect to
M(x′), then the privacy loss random variable is undefined.) Let Z = f(M(x)). That is, Z ∈ R is
the random variable generated by applying the function f to the output of M(x). (The randomness
of Z comes entirely from the algorithm M .) Then Z is called the privacy loss random variable and
is denoted Z ← PrivLoss (M(x)‖M(x′)).
3In the information theory literature, the term “relative information spectrum” is sometimes used for the distri-
bution of what we call the privacy loss random variable [SV16; Liu18].
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Concentrated differential privacy can be formulated in terms of the moment generating function
of the privacy loss [BS16]. Specifically, for any M : X n → Y, any x, x′ ∈ X n, and any α ∈ (1,∞),
we have
Dα
(
M(x)
∥∥M(x′)) = 1
α− 1 log
(
E
Z←PrivLoss(M(x)‖M(x′))
[
e(α−1)Z
])
(6)
Approximate differential privacy can also be characterized via the privacy loss as follows. This
characterization is implicit in the work of Bun and Steinke [BS16, Lemma B.2].
Lemma 9. Let ε, δ ≥ 0. Let M : X n → Y be a randomized algorithm. Then M satisfies (ε, δ)-
differential privacy if and only if
δ ≥ E
Z←PrivLoss(M(x)‖M(x′))
[
max{0, 1− eε−Z}] (7)
= P
Z←PrivLoss(M(x)‖M(x′))
[Z > ε]− eε · P
Z′←PrivLoss(M(x′)‖M(x))
[−Z ′ > ε] (8)
=
∫ ∞
ε
eε−z P
Z←PrivLoss(M(x)‖M(x′))
[Z > z]dz (9)
for all x, x′ ∈ X n differing on a single element.
Observe that, by Markov’s inequality, for all α > 1, it suffices to set
δ = P
Z←PrivLoss(M(x)‖M(x′))
[Z > ε]
≤ e−(α−1)ε · E
Z←PrivLoss(M(x)‖M(x′))
[
e(α−1)Z
]
= e(α−1)(Dα(M(x)‖M(x
′))−ε). (10)
This is the usual expression that is used to convert bounds on the privacy loss or Re´nyi divergence
into approximate differential privacy. Lemma 9 and Proposition 12 represent an improvement on
this.
Proof. Fix neighbouring inputs x, x′ ∈ X n. Let f : Y → R be as in Definition 8. For notational
simplicity, let Y = M(x) and Y ′ = M(x′) and Z = f(Y ) and Z ′ = −f(Y ′). This is equivalent to
Z ← PrivLoss (M(x)‖M(x′)) and Z ′ ← PrivLoss (M(x′)‖M(x)). Our first goal is to prove that
sup
E⊂Y
P [Y ∈ E]− eεP [Y ′ ∈ E] = E [max{0, 1− eε−Z}].
For any E ⊂ Y, we have
P
[
Y ′ ∈ E] = E [I[Y ′ ∈ E]] = E [I[Y ∈ E] · e−f(Y )].
This is because e−f(y) = P[Y=y]P[Y ′=y] .
4
Thus, for all E ⊂ Y, we have
P [Y ∈ E]− eεP [Y ′ ∈ E] = E [I[Y ∈ E] · (1− eε−f(Y ))].
4Here we abuse notation: We use notation that only is well-defined for discrete random variables. However, the
result holds in general under appropriate assumptions.
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Now it is easy to identify the worst event as E = {y ∈ Y : 1− eε−f(y) > 0}. Thus
sup
E⊂Y
P [Y ∈ E]− eεP [Y ′ ∈ E] = E [I[1− eε−f(Y ) > 0] · (1− eε−f(Y ))] = E [max{0, 1− eε−Z}].
Alternatively, since the worst event is equivalently E = {y ∈ Y : f(y) > ε}, we have
sup
E⊂Y
P [Y ∈ E]− eεP [Y ′ ∈ E] = P [f(Y ) > ε]− eεP [f(Y ′) > ε] = P [Z > ε]− eεP [−Z ′ > ε].
It only remains to show that
E
[
max{0, 1− eε−Z}] = ∫ ∞
ε
eε−zP [Z > z]dz.
This follows from integration by parts: Let u(z) = P [Z > z] and v(z) = 1 − eε−z and w(z) =
u(z) · v(z). Then
E
[
max{0, 1− eε−Z}] = ∫ ∞
ε
v(z) · u′(z)dz =
∫ ∞
ε
(
w′(z)− v′(z) · u(z)) dz
= lim
z→∞w(z)− w(ε) +
∫ ∞
ε
eε−zP [Z > z]dz.
Now w(ε) = u(ε) · (1− eε−ε) = 0 and 0 ≤ limz→∞w(z) ≤ limz→∞ P [Z > z] = 0, as required.
Proof of Theorem 7. We will use Lemma 9, Equation 8. Thus our main task is to determine the
distribution of the privacy loss random variable.
Fix neighbouring inputs x, x′ ∈ X n. Without loss of generality, we may assume that q(x) = 0
and q(x′) > 0. Now we have q(x′) ≤ ∆. Let f : Y → R be as in Definition 8. For notational
simplicity, let Y = M(x) ∼ NZ
(
0, σ2
)
and Y ′ = M(x′) ∼ NZ
(
q(x′), σ2
)
and Z = f(Y ) and
Z ′ = −f(Y ′). This is equivalent to Z ← PrivLoss (M(x)‖M(x′)) and Z ′ ← PrivLoss (M(x′)‖M(x)).
We must show that
P [Z > ε]− eεP [−Z ′ > ε] ≤ P
Y←NZ(0,σ2)
[
Y >
εσ2
∆
− ∆
2
]
− eε · P
Y←NZ(0,σ2)
[
Y >
εσ2
∆
+
∆
2
]
For y ∈ Y, we have
f(y) = log
(
P [Y = y]
P [Y ′ = y]
)
= log
(
e−(y−q(x))2/2σ2
e−(y−q(x′))2/2σ2
)
=
(y − q(x′))2 − y2
2σ2
=
q(x′) · (q(x′)− 2y)
2σ2
.
Thus, for all y ∈ Y,
f(y) > ε ⇐⇒ −y > σ
2ε
q(x′)
− q(x
′)
2
.
We note that Y and −Y and Y ′ − q(x′) and q(x′)− Y ′ all have the same distribution. Hence
P [Z > ε] = P [f(Y ) > ε] = P
[
−Y > σ
2ε
q(x′)
− q(x
′)
2
]
= P
[
Y >
σ2ε
q(x′)
− q(x
′)
2
]
and
P
[−Z ′ > ε] = P [−Y ′ > σ2ε
q(x′)
− q(x
′)
2
]
= P
[
Y − q(x′) > σ
2ε
q(x′)
− q(x
′)
2
]
= P
[
Y >
σ2ε
q(x′)
+
q(x′)
2
]
.
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Proofs of the analytical bounds. We now provide the proofs of the two aforementioned ana-
lytical bounds for (ε, δ)-differential privacy our theorem readily implies.
Lemma 10. In the setting of Theorem 7, for ∆ = 1, we have δ ≤ e−bεσ2e2/2σ2/
√
2piσ2 , where b·e
denotes rounding to the nearest integer. More generally, δ ≤∑dεσ2/∆+∆/2e
k=dεσ2/∆−∆/2e
e−k
2/2σ2√
2piσ2
Proof. By Theorem 7, we have
δ = P
Y←NZ(0,σ2)
[
Y >
εσ2
∆
− ∆
2
]
− eε · P
Y←NZ(0,σ2)
[
Y >
εσ2
∆
+
∆
2
]
≤ P
Y←NZ(0,σ2)
[
Y >
εσ2
∆
− ∆
2
]
− P
Y←NZ(0,σ2)
[
Y >
εσ2
∆
+
∆
2
]
=
dεσ2/∆+∆/2e∑
k=dεσ2/∆−∆/2e
P
Y←NZ(0,σ2)
[Y = k]
and the result now follows from the bound on the normalization constant from Fact 17.
Lemma 11. In the setting of Theorem 7, if ε > ∆
2
2σ2
and εσ
2
∆ +
∆
2 ,
εσ2
∆ − ∆2 /∈ N then
δ ≤ P
X←N (0,σ2)
[
X >
⌊
εσ2
∆
− ∆
2
⌋]
−
(
1− 1√
2piσ2 + 1
)
eε P
X←N (0,σ2)
[
X >
⌊
εσ2
∆
+
∆
2
⌋]
. (11)
Proof. Let ε > ∆
2
2σ2
be such that εσ
2
∆ +
∆
2 /∈ N, and set M(ε, σ) :=
⌈
εσ2/∆−∆/2⌉ and m(ε, σ) :=⌊
εσ2/∆ + ∆/2
⌋
. Then, by Proposition 23,
P
X←NZ(0,σ2)
[
X >
εσ2
∆
− ∆
2
]
= P
X←NZ(0,σ2)
[X ≥M(ε, σ)] ≤ P
X←N (0,σ2)
[X ≥M(ε, σ)− 1]
≤ P
X←N (0,σ2)
[
X ≥
⌊
εσ2
∆
− ∆
2
⌋]
Conversely, by a comparison series-integral, we can easily show that, for any integer m,
∞∑
n=m
e−n
2/(2σ2) =
∞∑
n=m
∫ n+1
n
e−n
2/(2σ2) dx ≥
∫ ∞
m
e−x
2/(2σ2) dx =
√
2piσ2 P
X←N (0,σ2)
[X ≥ m]
which, combined with Fact 17 on the normalization constant of the discrete Gaussian, yields
P
X←NZ(0,σ2)
[
X >
εσ2
∆
+
∆
2
]
= P
X←NZ(0,σ2)
[X ≥ m(ε, σ)] ≥ 1
1 + 1√
2piσ2
P
X←N (0,σ2)
[X ≥ m(ε, σ)]
The result then follows from Theorem 7.
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2.3 Converting Concentrated Differential Privacy to Approximate Differential
Privacy
We have stated guarantees for both concentrated differential privacy (Theorem 4) and approximate
differential privacy (Theorem 7). Now we show how to convert from the former to the latter
(Corollary 13). This is particularly useful if the discrete Gaussian is being used repeatedly and
we want to provide a privacy guarantee for the composition – concentrated differential privacy has
cleaner composition guarantees than approximate differential privacy. We believe this result to be
of independent interest.
We start with a conversion from Re´nyi differential privacy to approximate differential privacy.
Proposition 12. Let M : X n → Y be a randomized algorithm. Let α ∈ (1,∞) and ε ≥ 0. Suppose
Dα (M(x)‖M(x′)) ≤ τ for all x, x′ ∈ X n differing in a single entry.5 Then M is (ε, δ)-differentially
private for
δ =
e(α−1)(τ−ε)
α− 1 ·
(
1− 1
α
)α
≤ e
(α−1)(τ−ε)−1
α− 1 . (12)
Proof. Fix neighbouring x, x′ ∈ X n and let Z ← PrivLoss (M(x)‖M(x′)). We have
E
[
e(α−1)Z
]
= e(α−1)Dα(M(x)‖M(x
′)) ≤ e(α−1)τ .
By Lemma 9, our goal is to prove that δ ≥ E [max{0, 1− eε−Z}]. Our approach is to pick c > 0
such that max{0, 1− eε−z} ≤ c · e(α−1)z for all z ∈ R. Then
E
[
max{0, 1− eε−Z}] ≤ E [c · e(α−1)Z] ≤ c · e(α−1)τ .
We identify the smallest possible value of c:
c = sup
z∈R
max{0, 1− eε−z}
e(α−1)z
= sup
z∈R
ez−α·z − eε−α·z = sup
z∈R
f(z),
where f(z) = ez−α·z − eε−α·z. We have
f ′(z) = ez−αz(1− α)− eε−αz(−α) = e−αz(αeε − (α− 1)ez).
Clearly f ′(z) = 0 ⇐⇒ ez = αα−1eε ⇐⇒ z = ε− log(1− 1/α). Thus
c = f(ε− log(1− 1/α))
=
(
α
α− 1e
ε
)1−α
− eε ·
(
α
α− 1e
ε
)−α
=
(
α
α− 1e
ε − eε
)
·
(
α− 1
α
· e−ε
)α
=
eε
α− 1 ·
(
1− 1
α
)α
· e−αε.
Thus
E
[
max{0, 1− eε−Z}] ≤ eε
α− 1 ·
(
1− 1
α
)α
· e−αε · e(α−1)τ = e
(α−1)(τ−ε)
α− 1 ·
(
1− 1
α
)α
= δ.
5This assumption is the definition of (α, τ)-Re´nyi differential privacy [Mir17].
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Asoodeh, Liao, Calmon, Kosut, and Sankar [ALCKS20] provide an optimal conversion from
Re´nyi differential privacy to approximate differential privacy – i.e., an optimal version of Proposi-
tion 12. Specifically, their bound is
δ = inf
{
δˆ ∈ [0, 1] : ∀p ∈ (δˆ, 1) pα(p− δˆ)1−α + (1− p)α(eε − p+ δˆ)1−α ≤ e(α−1)(τ−ε)
}
. (13)
Clearly, the expression in Proposition 12 is simpler than this. Moreover, our expression is nu-
merically stable, whereas the alternative is unstable for small values of δ. We implemented both
methods and found that they yield very similar results for the parameter regime of interest, but
numerical stability was a significant practical issue.
By taking the infimum over all divergence parameters α, Proposition 12 entails the following
conversion from concentrated differential privacy to approximate differential privacy.
Corollary 13. Let M : X n → Y be a randomized algorithm satisfying ρ-concentrated differential
privacy. Then M is (ε, δ)-differentially private for any ε ≥ 0 and
δ = inf
α∈(1,∞)
e(α−1)(αρ−ε)
α− 1 ·
(
1− 1
α
)α
≤ inf
α∈(1,∞)
e(α−1)(αρ−ε)−1
α− 1 . (14)
Corollary 13 should be contrasted with the standard bound [DRV10; DR16; BS16; Mir17] of
δ = inf
α∈(1,∞)
e(α−1)(αρ−ε) = e−(ε−ρ)
2/4ρ, (15)
which holds when ε ≥ ρ > 0. Bun and Steinke [BS16] prove an intermediate bound of
δ = 2
√
piρ · eε · P
X←N (0,1)
[
X >
ε+ ρ√
2ρ
]
(16)
Efficient computation of δ. For the looser expression in Corollary 13, we can analytically find
an optimal α. However, we can efficiently compute a tighter numerical bound: The equality in
Equation 14 is equivalent to
δ = inf
α∈(1,∞)
eg(α) where g(α) = (α− 1)(αρ− ε) + α · log(1− 1/α)− log(α− 1). (17)
We have
g′(α) = (2α− 1)ρ− ε+ log(1− 1/α) (18)
and
g′′(α) = 2ρ+
1
α(α− 1) > 0. (19)
Since g is a smooth convex function with limα→1+ g′(α) = −∞ and g′( ε+12ρ + 2) > 0, it has a unique
minimizer. We can find the minimizer by searching for α∗ ∈ (1, ε+12ρ + 2) such that g′(α∗) = 0. This
search can be conducted by binary search since, if α < α∗, we have g′(α) < 0 and, if α > α∗, we
have g′(α) > 0.
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3 Utility
We now consider how much noise the discrete Gaussian adds. As a comparison point, we consider
both the continuous Gaussian and, in the interest of a fair comparison, the rounded Gaussian – i.e.,
a sample from the continuous Gaussian rounded to the nearest integral value. In Figure 2, we
show how these compare numerically. We see that the tail of the rounded Gaussian stochastically
dominates that of the discrete Gaussian. In other words, the utility of the discrete Gaussian is
strictly better than the rounded Gaussian (although not by much for reasonable values of σ, i.e.,
those which are not very small).
Figure 2: Comparison of tail bounds and variance for continuous, discrete, and rounded Gaussians.
To obtain analytic bounds, we begin by bounding the moment generating function:
Lemma 14. Let t, σ ∈ R with σ > 0. Then E
X←NZ(0,σ2)
[
etX
] ≤ et2σ2/2.
For comparison, recall that the continuous Gaussian satisfies the same bound, but with equality:
E
X←N (0,σ2)
[
etX
]
= et
2σ2/2 for all t, σ ∈ R with σ > 0.
Proof. By Lemma 6,
E
X←NZ(0,σ2)
[
etX
]
=
∑
x∈Z e
tx−x2/2σ2∑
y∈Z e−y
2/2σ2
=
∑
x∈Z e
−(x−tσ2)2/2σ2 · et2σ2/2∑
y∈Z e−y
2/2σ2
≤ et2σ2/2.
The bound on the moment generating function shows that the discrete Gaussian is subgaussian
[Riv12]. Standard facts about subgaussian random variables yield bounds on the variance and tails:
Corollary 15. Let X ← NZ
(
0, σ2
)
. Then Var [X] ≤ σ2 and P [X ≥ λ] ≤ e−λ2/2σ2 for all λ ≥ 0.
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Thus the variance of the discrete Gaussian is at most that of the corresponding continuous
Gaussian and we also have subgaussian tail bounds. In fact, it is possible to obtain slightly tighter
bounds, showing that the variance of the discrete Gaussian is strictly less than that of the continuous
Gaussian. We elaborate in the following subsections, providing tighter variance and tail bounds.
However, these improvements are most pronounced for small σ, which is not the typical regime of
interest for differential privacy. Nonetheless, these facts may be of independent interest.
3.1 A Few Good Facts
Here, we state and derive some basic and useful facts about the discrete Gaussian, which will be
useful in proving tighter bounds. We start with the expectation of NZ(µ, σ2). It is straightforward
to see by a change of index that, for µ ∈ Z, one has E [NZ(µ, σ2)] = µ; however, the case µ /∈ Z is
not as immediate. Our first result states that, indeed, NZ(µ, σ2) has mean µ even for non-integer
µ:
Fact 16 (Expectation). For all σ ∈ R with σ > 0, and all µ ∈ R, E [NZ(µ, σ2)] = µ .
Proof. By the Poisson summation formula [Poi; Wei],
E
[NZ(µ, σ2)] = ∑n∈Z ne−(n−µ)2/(2σ2)∑
n∈Z e−(n−µ)
2/(2σ2)
=
∑
n∈Z fˆ(n)∑
n∈Z gˆ(n)
,
where f(x) = xe−(n−µ)2/(2σ2) and g(x) = xe−(n−µ)2/(2σ2). For t ∈ R, we can compute their Fourier
transforms as
fˆ(t) =
∫
R
g(x)e−2piixt dx =
√
2piσ2(µ− 2piiσ2t)e−2pi2t2σ2−2piitµ
gˆ(t) =
∫
R
f(x)e−2piixt dx =
√
2piσ2e−2pi
2t2σ2−2piitµ
so that
E
[NZ(µ, σ2)] = µ∑n∈Z e−2pi2n2σ2−2piinµ − 2piiσ2∑n∈Z ne−2pi2n2σ2−2piinµ∑
n∈Z e−2pi
2n2σ2−2piinµ = µ,
as the second sum in the numerator is zero.
We now turn to the normalization constant of NZ(0, σ2), comparing it to the normalization
constant
√
2piσ2 of the corresponding continuous Gaussian.
Fact 17 (Normalization constant). For all σ ∈ R with σ > 0,
max{
√
2piσ2, 1} ≤
∑
n∈Z
e−n
2/(2σ2) ≤
√
2piσ2 + 1 . (20)
Proof. We first show the lower bound. Clearly
∑
n∈Z e
−n2/(2σ2) ≥ e−02/2σ2 = 1. By the Poisson
summation formula, ∑
n∈Z
e−n
2/(2σ2) =
∑
n∈Z
√
2piσ2 · e−2pi2σ2n2 ≥
√
2piσ2 · 1.
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As for the upper bound, it follows from a standard comparison between series and integral:
∑
n∈Z
e−n
2/(2σ2) = 1 + 2
∞∑
n=1
e−n
2/(2σ2) ≤ 1 + 2
∞∑
n=1
∫ n
n−1
e−x
2/(2σ2)dx = 1 + 2
∫ ∞
0
e−x
2/(2σ2)dx .
The above bounds, albeit simple to obtain, are not quite as tight as they could be. We state
below a refinement, which can be found, e.g., in [Ste17, Claim 2.8.1]:
Fact 18 (Normalization constant, refined). For all σ ∈ R with σ > 0,
√
2piσ2 · (1 + 2e−2pi2σ2) ≤
∑
n∈Z
e−n
2/(2σ2) ≤
√
2piσ2 · (1 + 2e−2pi2σ2) + e−2pi2σ2 (21)
and
1 + 2e−1/(2σ
2) ≤
∑
n∈Z
e−n
2/(2σ2) ≤ 1 + 2e−1/(2σ2) +
√
2piσ2e−1/(2σ
2) (22)
The first set of bounds is better for σ ≥ 1√
2pi
, and the second for σ < 1√
2pi
.
The bounds obtained in Fact 18 are depicted in the figure below.
Figure 3: Bounds from Fact 18 on the normalization constant
∑
n∈Z e
−n2/(2σ2), as a function of σ.
Note that the normalization constant of the continuous Gaussian,
√
2piσ2 (in orange) becomes a very
accurate approximation for σ  1; however, for σ  1, it is not, as the upper and lower bound
from Fact 18 both converge towards 1, as expected. Interestingly, we see that the lower bound
(green) empirically seems to be nearly tight, as it appears to coincide with the exact expression
of the normalization constant (dotted blue) for all σ > 0. The discontinuity in the upper bound
(orange) happens at σ = 1√
2pi
.
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3.2 Tighter Variance and Tail Bounds
We now analyze the variance of the discrete Gaussian, showing that it is stricty smaller than that of
the corresponding continuous Gaussian (and asymptotically the same), with a much better variance
for small σ.
Proposition 19 (Variance). For all σ ∈ R with σ > 0,
Var
[NZ(0, σ2)] ≤ σ2(1− 4pi2σ2
e4pi2σ2 − 1
)
< σ2 (23)
Moreover, if σ2 ≤ 1/3 then Var [NZ(0, σ2)] ≤ 3 · e−1/2σ2.
To prove Proposition 19 we use the following lemma which relates upper bounds on the variance
of a discrete Gaussian to lower bounds on it, and vice-versa.
Lemma 20. For σ > 0,
Var
[NZ(0, σ2)] = σ2(1− 4pi2σ2Var [NZ(0, 1/(4pi2σ2))]) . (24)
Proof. By applying the Poisson summation formula to both numerator and denominator of the
variance, we have
Var
[NZ(0, σ2)] = ∑n∈Z n2e−n2/(2σ2)∑
n∈Z e−n
2/(2σ2)
=
∑
n∈Z f(n)∑
n∈Z g(n)
=
∑
n∈Z fˆ(n)∑
n∈Z gˆ(n)
where f(x) = x2e−x2/(2σ2), g(x) = e−x2/(2σ2). Now, for t ∈ R, we can compute
fˆ(t) =
∫
R
f(x)e−2piixt dx =
√
2piσ3e−2pi
2t2σ2(1− 4pi2t2σ2)
gˆ(t) =
∫
R
g(x)e−2piixt dx =
√
2piσe−2pi
2t2σ2 .
Thus
Var
[NZ(0, σ2)] = σ2∑n∈Z e−2pi2n2σ2(1− 4pi2n2σ2)∑
n∈Z e−2pi
2n2σ2
= σ2
(
1− 4pi2σ2
∑
n∈Z n
2e−2pi2n2σ2∑
n∈Z e−2pi
2n2σ2
)
= σ2
(
1− 4pi2σ2
∑
n∈Z n
2e−n2/(2τ2)∑
n∈Z e−n
2/(2τ2)
)
= σ2
(
1− 4pi2σ2Var [NZ(0, τ2)])
where we set τ := 12piσ .
Next we have a lower bound on the variance.
Proposition 21 (Universal Variance Lower Bound). Let X be a distribution on R such that
D2 (X + 1‖X) ≤ ε2. Then
Var [X] ≥ 1
eε2 − 1 (25)
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Proof. We follow the proof Lemma C.2 of Bun and Steinke [BS16]. For notational simplicity we
assume X has a probability density with respect to the Lesbesgue measure on the reals, which we
abusively denote by P [X = x]. Let f(x) = log(P [X + 1 = x]/P [X = x]) – i.e., f is the logarithm
of the Radon-Nikodym derivative of the shifted distribution X + 1 with respect to the distribution
of X. Then
eD2(X+1‖X) =
∫
R
P [X + 1 = x]2P [X = x]−1dx =
∫
R
(
P [X + 1 = x]
P [X = x]
)2
P [X = x]dx = E
[
e2f(X)
]
and
E [X + 1] =
∫
R
xP [X + 1 = x]dx =
∫
R
xef(x)P [X = x]dx = E
[
X · ef(X)
]
.
We also have
E
[
ef(X)
]
=
∫
R
P [X + 1 = x]
P [X = x]
P [X = x]dx =
∫
R
P [X = x]dx = 1.
By Cauchy-Schwarz,
1 = E [X + 1]− E [X] = E
[
X · (ef(X) − 1)
]
≤
√
E [X2] · E [(ef(X) − 1)2].
This rearranges to give
E
[
X2
] ≥ 1
E
[
(ef(X) − 1)2] = 1E [e2f(X) − 2ef(X) + 1] = 1eD2(X+1‖X) − 1 .
The discrete Gaussian NZ
(
0, 1/ε2
)
satisfies the hypotheses of Proposition 21 (by Proposition
5), which yields the following corollary.
Corollary 22. For all σ > 0,
Var
X←NZ(0,σ2)
[X] ≥ 1
e1/σ2 − 1 (26)
We emphasize that the lower bound of Proposition 21 is not specific to the discrete Gaussian.
It applies to any distribution X such that adding X to a sensitivity-1 function provides 12ε
2-
concentrated differential privacy.
Proof of Proposition 19. Combining Lemma 20 with Proposition 21 (specifically, Corollary 22)
yields the first claim:
Var
[NZ(0, σ2)] = σ2(1− 4pi2σ2Var [NZ(0, 1/(4pi2σ2))]) ≤ σ2(1− 4pi2σ2
e4pi2σ2 − 1
)
.
Now we establish the last part of the proposition. We have (m+ 1)2 ≥ 2m+ 1 and, hence,
Var
[NZ(0, σ2)] = ∑n∈Z n2 · e−n2/2σ2∑
n∈Z e−n
2/2σ2
≤
∑
n∈Z
n2 · e−n2/2σ2 = 2
∞∑
m=0
(m+ 1)2 · e−(m+1)2/2σ2
≤ 2
∞∑
m=0
(m+ 1)2 · e−(2m+1)/2σ2 = 2
e1/2σ2
∞∑
m=0
(m+ 1)2e−m/σ
2
.
It only remains to show that
∑∞
m=0(m+ 1)
2e−m/σ2 ≤ 3/2 when σ2 ≤ 1/3. For x ∈ (−1, 1), one can
show that
∑∞
m=0(m+ 1)
2xm = 1+x
(1−x)3 . Set x = e
−1/σ2 to conclude.
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Next we prove tail bounds:
Proposition 23. For all m ∈ Z with m ≥ 1 and all σ ∈ R with σ > 0,
P
X←NZ(0,σ2)
[X ≥ m] ≤ P
X←N (0,σ2)
[X ≥ m− 1]. (27)
Moreover, if σ ≥ 1/√2pi, we have
P
X←NZ(0,σ2)
[X ≥ m] ≥ 1
1 + 3e−2pi2σ2
P
X←N (0,σ2)
[X ≥ m]. (28)
Proof. We have P
X←NZ(0,σ2)
[X ≥ m] =
∑∞
k=m e
−k2/2σ2∑
`∈Z e−`
2/2σ2
. By Fact 17, the denominator is at least
√
2piσ2. For the numerator, we have
∞∑
k=m
e−k
2/2σ2 =
∫ ∞
m−1
e−dxe
2/2σ2dx ≤
∫ ∞
m−1
e−x
2/2σ2dx =
√
2piσ2 · P
X←N (0,σ2)
[X ≥ m− 1].
Turning to the lower bound, suppose σ ≥ 1/√2pi; by Fact 18, we have ∑`∈Z e−`2/2σ2 ≤ √2piσ2 ·
(1 + 3e−2pi2σ2), which combined with
∞∑
k=m
e−k
2/2σ2 =
∫ ∞
m
e−bxc
2/2σ2dx ≥
∫ ∞
m
e−x
2/2σ2dx =
√
2piσ2 · P
X←N (0,σ2)
[X ≥ m]
gives the claim.
Note that the above proposition focuses on upper tail bounds, but by symmetry of the discrete
Gaussian one immediately gets similar lower tail bounds. The upshot is that, up to a small shift
or (1 + o(1)) multiplicative factor, discrete and continuous Gaussians display the same tails.
One can actually slightly refine the above upper bound, by comparing the discrete Gaussian to
the rounded Gaussian Nround(0, σ2), obtained by rounding a standard continuous Gaussian to the
nearest integer:
Proposition 24. For all m ∈ Z with m ≥ 1 and all σ ∈ R with σ > 0,
P
X←NZ(0,σ2)
[X ≥ m] ≤ P
X←Nround(0,σ2)
[X ≥ m] + 1
2
P
X←NZ(0,σ2)
[X = m] .
Proof. On the one hand, by definition of a rounded Gaussian, we have
√
2piσ2 P
X←Nround(0,σ2)
[X ≥ m] =
∫ ∞
m−1/2
e−x
2/(2σ2) dx =
∫ m
m−1/2
e−x
2/(2σ2) dx+
∫ ∞
m
e−x
2/(2σ2) dx ;
on the other hand, we have
√
2piσ2 P
X←NZ(0,σ2)
[X ≥ m+ 1] =
√
2piσ2
∑∞
n=m+1 e
−n2/(2σ2)∑
n∈Z e−n
2/(2σ2)
≤
∞∑
n=m+1
e−n
2/(2σ2)
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by Fact 17. Similarly as before, we can write
∞∑
n=m+1
e−n
2/(2σ2) ≤
∞∑
n=m+1
∫ n
n−1
e−x
2/(2σ2) dx =
∫ ∞
m
e−x
2/(2σ2) dx
using monotonicity of x 7→ e−x2/(2σ2) on [0,∞). Combining the three equations above gives
P
X←NZ(0,σ2)
[X ≥ m] ≤ P
X←NZ(0,σ2)
[X = m] + P
X←Nround(0,σ2)
[X ≥ m]− 1√
2piσ2
∫ m
m−1/2
e−x
2/(2σ2) dx
≤ P
X←NZ(0,σ2)
[X = m] + P
X←Nround(0,σ2)
[X ≥ m]− 1
2
e−m2/(2σ2)∑
n∈Z e−n
2/(2σ2)
=
1
2
P
X←NZ(0,σ2)
[X = m] + P
X←Nround(0,σ2)
[X ≥ m],
as
∫m
m−1/2 e
−x2/(2σ2) ≥ 12e−m
2/(2σ2) and
∑
n∈Z e
−n2/(2σ2) ≥
√
2piσ2 by Fact 17.
We highlight the fact that comparing with the rounded Gaussian, as the above proposition
does, is meaningful, since by postprocessing any differential privacy guarantee implied by adding
rounded Gaussian noise to discrete data is at least as good as that implied by adding continuous
Gaussian noise to the same discrete data.
3.3 Other Discretizations, and Convergence to the Continuous Gaussian
Although we focused on this paper on the discrete Gaussian over Z, one can of course consider
different discretizations, such as the discrete Gaussian over αZ := {αz : z ∈ Z} for some fixed
α > 0. We denote this distribution by NαZ(µ, σ2). It is defined by
∀x ∈ αZ P
X←NαZ(µ,σ2)
[X = x] =
e−(x−µ)2/2σ2∑
y∈αZ e−(y−µ)
2/2σ2
. (29)
It is immediate that
∀x ∈ αZ P
X←NαZ(µ,σ2)
[X = x] = P
X←NZ( µα , σ
2
α2
)
[
X =
x
α
]
. (30)
In particular, all our results on the (standard) discrete Gaussian will translate to the discrete
Gaussian over αZ, up to that change of the parameters µ and σ.
Further, one would expect than, as α → 0+, the discrete Gaussian NαZ(0, σ2) converges to
N (0, σ2). We show that this is indeed the case:
Proposition 25. For all σ ∈ R with σ > 0, as α→ 0+ the discrete Gaussian NαZ(0, σ2) converges
in distribution to the continuous Gaussian N (0, σ2).
Proof. Fix any 0 < α ≤
√
2piσ2. By Equation 30, for any x ∈ αZ, we have P
X←NαZ(0,σ2)
[X ≤ x] =
P
X←NZ(0, σ2α2 )
[X ≤ x/α], and so, by Proposition 23,
P
X←N (0, σ2
α2
)
[αX ≤ x− α] ≤ P
X←NαZ(0,σ2)
[X ≤ x] ≤ 1
1 + 3e−2pi2σ2/α2
P
X←N (0, σ2
α2
)
[αX ≤ x]
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or, equivalently,
P
Y←N (0,σ2)
[Y ≤ x− α] ≤ P
X←NαZ(0,σ2)
[X ≤ x] ≤ 1
1 + 3e−2pi2σ2/α2
P
Y←N (0,σ2)
[Y ≤ x] .
Both sides converge to P
Y←N (0,σ2)
[Y ≤ x] as α→ 0+.
In applications where query values are not naturally discrete, it is necessary to round them before
adding discrete noise. A finer discretization (i.e., smaller α) entails less error being introduced by
the rounding.
4 Discrete Laplace
We now compare the discrete Gaussian with the most obvious alternative – the discrete Laplace.
But first we give a formal definition and state some relevant facts.
Definition 26 (Discrete Laplace). Let t > 0. The discrete Laplace distribution with scale parameter
t is denoted LapZ(t). It is a probability distribution supported on the integers and defined by
∀x ∈ Z, P
X←LapZ(t)
[X = x] =
e1/t − 1
e1/t + 1
· e−|x|/t. (31)
The discrete Laplace (also known as the two-sided geometric) was introduced into the differential
privacy literature by Ghosh, Roughgarden, and Sundararajan [GRS12], who showed that it satisfies
strong optimality properties.
Lemma 27 (Discrete Laplace Privacy). Let ∆, ε > 0. Let q : X n → Z satisfy |q(x) − q(x′)| ≤ ∆
for all x, x′ ∈ X n differing on a single entry. Define a randomized algorithm M : X n → Z by
M(x) = q(x) + Y where Y ← LapZ(∆/ε). Then M satisfies (ε, 0)-differential privacy.
Lemma 28 (Discrete Laplace Utility). Let ε > 0 and let Y ← LapZ(1/ε). The distribution is
symmetric; in particular, E [Y ] = 0. We have E [|Y |] = 2·eε
e2ε−1 and Var [Y ] = E
[
Y 2
]
= 2·e
ε
(eε−1)2 . For
all λ < ε,
E
[
eλ|Y |
]
=
eε − 1
eε + 1
· e
ε−λ + 1
eε−λ − 1 .
For all m ∈ N,
P [Y ≥ m] = P [Y ≤ −m] = e
−ε(m−1)
eε + 1
.
We remark that the discrete Laplace can also be efficiently sampled. Indeed, it is a key subrou-
tine of our algorithm for sampling a discrete Gaussian; see Section 5.
There are two immediate qualitative differences between the discrete Laplace and the discrete
Gaussian.6 In terms of utility, the discrete Laplace has subexponential tails (i.e., decaying as
e−εm), whereas the discrete Gaussian has subgaussian tails (i.e., decaying as e−m2/2σ2). In terms
of privacy, the discrete Gaussian satisfies concentrated differential privacy, whereas the discrete
6The entire discussion in this section applies equally well to the continuous analogues of these distributions.
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Laplace satisfies pure differential privacy; pure differential privacy is a qualitatively stronger privacy
condition than concentrated differential privacy.
Thus neither distribution dominates the other. They offer different privacy-utility tradeoffs. If
the tails are important (e.g., for computing confidence intervals), then the discrete Gaussian is to
be favoured. If pure differential privacy is important, then the discrete Laplace is to be favoured.
We now consider a quantitative comparison. To quantify utility, we focus on the variance of the
distribution. (An alternative would be to consider the width of a confidence interval.) For now,
we will quantify privacy by concentrated differential privacy. Pure (ε, 0)-differential privacy implies
1
2ε
2-concentrated differential privacy; thus both distributions can be evaluated on this scale.
Consider a small ε > 0 and a counting query. We can attain 12ε
2-concentrated differential
privacy by adding noise from either NZ
(
0, 1/ε2
)
or LapZ(1/ε). By Corollary 15, Proposition 21,
and Lemma 28, we have
1
ε2
≥ Var
YG←NZ(0,1/ε2)
[YG] ≥ 1
eε2 − 1 =
1− o(1)
ε2
and Var
YL←LapZ(1/ε)
[YL] =
2 · eε
(eε − 1)2 =
2± o(1)
ε2
.
Thus, asymptotically (i.e., for small ε), the discrete Gaussian has half as much variance as the
discrete Laplace for the same level of privacy. In this comparison, the Gaussian clearly is better.
However, the above quantitative comparison is potentially unfair. Quantifying differential pri-
vacy by concentrated differential privacy may favour the Gaussian. If instead we demand pure
(ε, 0)-differential privacy or approximate (ε, δ)-differential privacy for a small δ > 0, then the com-
parison would yield the opposite conclusion. It is fundamentally difficult to compare algorithms
satisfying different versions of differential privacy, as there is no level playing field.
There is another factor to consider: A practical differentially private system will answer many
queries via independent noise addition. Thus the real object of interest is the privacy and utility
of the composition of many applications of noise addition.
For the rest of this section, we consider the task of answering k counting queries (or sensitivity-1
queries) by adding either discrete Gaussian or discrete Laplace noise. We will measure privacy by
approximate (ε, δ)-differential privacy over a range of parameters. The results are summarized in
Figure 4.
Concentrated differential privacy has an especially clean composition theorem [BS16]:
Lemma 29 (Composition for Concentrated Differential Privacy). Let M1 : X n → Y1 satisfy 12ε21-
concentrated differential privacy. Let M2 : X n × Y1 → Y2 be such that, for all y ∈ Y1, the restric-
tion M2(·, y) : X n → Y2 satisfies 12ε22-concentrated differential privacy. Define M∗ : X n → Y2 by
M∗(x) = M2(x,M1(x)). Then M∗ satisfies 12(ε
2
1 + ε
2
2)-concentrated differential privacy.
This result can be extended to k mechanisms by induction. Thus, to attain 12ε
2-concentrated
differential privacy for k counting queries, it suffices to add noise from NZ
(
0, k/ε2
)
to each value
independently. We then convert the overall 12ε
2-concentrated differential privacy guarantee into
approximate (ε′, δ)-differential privacy using Corollary 13.
In contrast, analysing the composition of multiple invocations of discrete Laplace noise ad-
dition is not as clean. We use an optimal composition result provided by Kairouz, Oh, and
Viswanath [KOV17; MV16]: The k-fold composition of (ε, δ)-differential privacy satisfies (ε′, δ′)-
differential privacy if and only if
1
(1 + eε)k
k∑
`=0
(
k
`
)
max
{
0, e`ε − eε′+(k−`)ε
}
≤ 1− 1− δ
′
(1− δ)k . (32)
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Figure 4: Comparison of discrete Gaussian and Laplace noise addition. Left: Utility is fixed (i.e.,
answer k = 100 counting queries each with variance 502 )and we consider the curve of approximate
(ε, δ)-differential privacy guarantees that we can achieve. Right: Privacy is fixed (i.e., approximate
(1, 10−6)-differential privacy) and we consider the utility (i.e., variance of noise added to each
answer) as we vary the number of counting queries to be answered.
In Figure 4, we compare the discrete Gaussian and the discrete Laplace in two ways. First (on
the left), we fix the utility and compare the approximate differential privacy guarantees. Specifically,
we fix the task of answering k = 100 counting queries with the noise added to each value having
variance 502. Both distributions yield different curves of (ε, δ)-differential privacy guarantees and
there are many points to consider. We see that, for this task, the discrete Gaussian attains better
(ε, δ)-differential privacy guarantees except for extremely small δ – specifically, δ < 10−45. For
ε = 1, the discrete Gaussian provides (1, 10−7)-differential privacy for this task, whereas the discrete
Laplace only provides (1, 206 × 10−7)-differential privacy. If we demand pure differential privacy,
then the discrete Laplace provides (2.83, 0)-differential privacy, but the discrete Gaussian cannot
provide pure differential privacy. The separation becomes more pronounced as the number of
queries grows.
Second (on the right of Figure 4), we fix the privacy goal to approximate (1, 10−6)-differential
privacy. We vary the number of counting queries (from k = 1 to k = 100) and measure the variance
of the noise that must be added to each query answer. For a small number of queries (k ≤ 10), the
discrete Laplace gives lower variance. However, as the number of queries increases, we see that the
discrete Laplace requires higher variance; for k = 100, the variance is 69% more.
Overall, Figure 4 demonstrates that the discrete Gaussian provides a better privacy-utility
tradeoff than the discrete Laplace, except in two narrow parameter regimes: Either a small number
of queries or if we demand something very close to pure differential privacy. We only compared
variances; if we compare confidence interval sizes instead, then this would further advantage the
Gaussian, which has lighter tails.
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5 Sampling
In this section, we show how to efficiently sample exactly from a discrete Gaussian on a finite
computer given access only to uniformly random bits. Such algorithms are already known [Kar16].
However, we include this both for completeness because we believe that our algorithms are simpler
than the prior work.
For simplicity, we focus our discussion of runtime only on the expected number of arithmetic
operations; each such operation will take time polylogarithmic in the bit complexity of the param-
eters (e.g., in the representation of σ2 as a rational number). We elaborate on this at the end of
the section.
In Algorithm 3, we present a simple and fast algorithm for discrete Gaussian sampling, with
the following guarantees:
Theorem 30. On input σ2 ∈ Q, the procedure described in Algorithm 3 outputs one sample from
NZ
(
0, σ2
)
and requires only a constant number of operations in expectation.
At a high level, the idea behind the algorithm is to first sample from a discrete Laplace dis-
tribution and then “convert” this into a discrete Gaussian by rejection sampling. In order to do
so, we provide two subroutines, which we believe to be of independent interest: the first, to effi-
ciently and exactly sample from a Bernoulli with parameter e−γ , for any rational parameter γ ≥ 0
(Proposition 31). The second, to efficiently and exactly sample from a discrete Laplace with scale
parameter t, for any positive integer t (Proposition 32).
5.1 Sampling Bernoulli(exp(−γ))
Our first subroutine, Algorithm 1, describes how to reduce the task of sampling from Bernoulli(exp(−γ))
to that of sampling from Bernoulli(γ/k) for various integers k ≥ 1. This procedure is based on a
technique of von Neumann [VN51; For72]. This procedure avoids complex operations, such as
computing the exponential function. Thus, for a rational γ, this can be implemented on a finite
computer. Specifically, for n, d ∈ N, to sample Bernoulli(n/d) it suffices to draw D ∈ {1, 2, . . . , d}
uniformly at random and output 1 if D ≤ n and output 0 if D > n. (To sample D ∈ {1, 2, · · · , d}
we can again use rejection sampling – that is, we uniformly sample D ∈ {1, 2, · · · , 2dlog2 de} and
reject and retry if D > d.)
In the rest of the analysis, we assume for the sake of abstraction that sampling Bernoulli(n/d)
given n, d ∈ N requires a constant number of arithmetic operations in expectation.
Proposition 31. On input (rational) γ ≥ 0, the procedure described in Algorithm 1 outputs on
sample from Bernoulli(exp(−γ)), and requires a constant number of operations in expectation.
Proof. First, consider the case where γ ∈ [0, 1]. For the analysis, we let Ak denote the value of A
in the k-th iteration of the loop in the algorithm, and K∗ denote the final value of K upon exiting
the loop. Then, for all k ∈ {0, 1, 2, · · · }, we have
P [K∗ > k] = P [A1 = A2 = · · · = Ak = 1] =
k∏
i=1
P [Ai = 1] =
k∏
i=1
γ
i
=
γk
k!
.
Thus
P [K∗ odd] =
∞∑
k=0
P [K∗ = 2k + 1] =
∞∑
k=0
(P [K∗ > 2k]− P [K∗ > 2k + 1]) =
∞∑
k=0
(
γ2k
(2k)!
− γ
2k+1
(2k + 1)!
)
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which is equal to e−γ as desired. Further, the expected number of operations is simply T (γ) =
O(E [K∗]) = O(
∑∞
k=0 P [K∗ > k]) = O(eγ) = O(1).
Now, if γ > 1, the procedure performs (at most) ` := bγc+ 1 independent sequential recursive
calls, getting ` independent samplesB1, · · · , B`−1 ∼ Bernoulli(exp(−1)) and C ∼ Bernoulli(exp(−(γ−
bγc))). Its output is then distributed as a Bernoulli random variable with parameter
P [B1 = B2 = · · · = B`−1 = C = 1] =
∏`
i=1 P [Bi = 1] · P [C = 1] = exp(−1)bγc · exp(γ − bγc) =
exp(−γ), as desired.
The number of recursive calls is at most `. However, the recursive calls will stop as soon as
B = 0 for the first time. We have P [B = 0] = 1− e−1. Thus the number of recursive calls follows a
truncated geometric distribution. The expected number of recursive calls is constant and, therefore,
the expected number of operations is too.
Algorithm 1 Algorithm for Sampling Bernoulli(exp(−γ)).
Input: Parameter γ ≥ 0.
Output: One sample from Bernoulli(exp(−γ)).
if γ ∈ [0, 1] then
Set K ← 1.
loop
Sample A← Bernoulli(γ/K).
if A = 0 then break the loop.
if A = 1 then set K ← K + 1 and continue the loop.
if K is odd then return 1.
if K is even then return 0.
else
for k = 1 to bγc do
Sample B ← Bernoulli(exp(−1)) . Recursive call.
if B = 0 then break the loop and return 0.
Sample C ← Bernoulli(exp(bγc − γ)) . Recursive call. γ − bγc ∈ [0, 1].
return C.
5.2 Sampling from a Discrete Laplace
Now we show how to efficiently and exactly sample from a discrete Laplace distribution; see Sec-
tion 4 for more about this distribution. Other methods for sampling from the discrete Laplace
distribution are known [SWSZW19].
Proposition 32. On input s, t ∈ Z with s, t ≥ 1, the procedure described in Algorithm 2 outputs
one sample from LapZ(t/s), and requires a constant number of operations in expectation.
Proof. To prove the theorem, we must verify two things: (1) we must show that, for each attempt
(i.e., for each iteration of the outer loop), conditioned on outputting a value Z (henceforth referred
to as success, and denoted >), the distribution of the output Z is LapZ(t/s) as desired; (2) we must
lower bound the probability that a given loop iteration is successful. This ensures that the loop
terminates quickly, giving the bound on the runtime.
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Algorithm 2 Algorithm for Sampling a Discrete Laplace
Input: Parameters s, t ∈ Z, s, t ≥ 1.
Output: One sample from LapZ(t/s).
loop . Repeat until successful
Sample U ∈ {0, 1, 2, · · · , t− 1} uniformly at random.
Sample D ← Bernoulli(exp(−U/t)). . Use Algorithm 1.
if D = 0 then reject and restart.
Initialize V ← 0.
loop . Generate V from Geometric(1− e−1).
Sample A← Bernoulli(exp(−1)). . Use Algorithm 1.
if A = 0 then break the loop.
if A = 1 then set V ← V + 1 and continue.
Set X ← U + t · V . . X is Geometric(1− e−1/t).
Set Y ← bX/sc . Y is Geometric(1− e−s/t).
Sample B ← Bernoulli(1/2).
if B = 1 and Y = 0 then reject and restart.
return Z ← (1− 2B) · Y . . Success; Z is a discrete Laplace.
To begin, we show that, conditioned on D = 1, X follows a geometric distribution with param-
eter τ := 1/t. Specifically, P [X = x | D = 1] = (1 − e−τ ) · e−xτ for every integer x ≥ 0. For any
such x, let ux := x mod t and vx = bx/tc, so that x = ux + t · vx. It is immediate to see that, as
defined by the algorithm, V is independent of both U and D and follows a geometric distribution
with parameter 1− e−1: that is, P [V = k] = (1− e−1) · e−k for every integer k ≥ 0. We thus have
P [X = x | D = 1] = P [U = ux, V = vx | D = 1] = P [U = ux | D = 1] · P [V = vx]
=
P [U = ux]
P [D = 1]
· P [D = 1 | U = ux] · (1− e−1) · e−vx
=
1/t
(1/t)
∑t−1
k=0 e
−k/t · e
−ux/t · (1− e−1) · e−vx
= (1− e−1/t) · e−(ux/t+vx) = (1− e−1/t) · e−x/t
as claimed.
We then claim that Y = bXs c (conditioned on D = 1) follows a Geometric(1−e−s/t) distribution
– i.e., P [Y = y | D = 1] = (1−e−s/t)·e−y·s/t for all integers y ≥ 0. This is an immediate consequence
of the following fact.
Fact 33. Fix p ∈ (0, 1]. Let G be a Geometric(1 − p) random variable, and n ≥ 1 be an integer.
Then
⌊
G
n
⌋
is a Geometric(1− q) random variable for q = pn.
Proof. For any integer k ≥ 0,
P [bG/nc = k] = P [nk ≤ G < (k + 1)n] =
(k+1)n−1∑
`=kn
(1− p)p` = (1− pn)pnk = (1− q)qk.
26
With this in hand, we analyze the distribution of Z conditioned on > (success), i.e., conditioned
on D = 1 and (B, Y ) 6= (1, 0).7 Let α := s/t for convenience. Recalling B is independent of D and
that B and Y (conditioned on D = 1) are independent, we have
P [(B, Y ) 6= (1, 0) | D = 1] = P [B = 1, Y > 0 | D = 1] + P [B = 0 | D = 1] = 1
2
(e−α + 1) .
For every z ∈ Z, we have, recalling that B and Y are independent,
P [Z = z | >] = P [(1− 2B)Y = z|(B, Y ) 6= (1, 0), D = 1]
=
P [(1− 2B)Y = z, (B, Y ) 6= (1, 0) | D = 1]
P [(B, Y ) 6= (1, 0) | D = 1]
=
P [Y = |z|, B = I[z < 0] | D = 1]
P [(B, Y ) 6= (1, 0) | D = 1]
=
P [Y = |z| | D = 1] · P [B = I[z < 0] | D = 1]
P [(B, Y ) 6= (1, 0) | D = 1]
=
P [Y = |z| | D = 1]
2P [(B, Y ) 6= (1, 0) | D = 1]
=
(1− e−α) · e−|z|·α
e−α + 1
,
by our previous computations. Thus, conditioned on success, Z follows a LapZ(1/α) distribution.
We then bound the probability that a fixed iteration of the loop succeeds:
P [>] = P [(B, Y ) 6= (1, 0) | D = 1]P [D = 1] = 1 + e
−α
2
·1
t
t−1∑
u=0
e−u/t =
1 + e−α
2
1− e−1
t(1− e−1/t) ≥
1− e−1
2
.
It follows that the number N of iterations of the outer loop needed to output a value Z is geomet-
rically distributed and satisfies E [N ] ≤ 2
1−e−1 < 3.2. Moreover, each iteration of the outer loop
requires a constant number of operations in expectations. This is because each of the subroutines
requires a constant number of operations in expectation and the inner loop runs a geometrically-
distributed number of times which is constant in expectation.
5.3 Sampling from a Discrete Gaussian
In Algorithm 3, we prove Theorem 30 and present our algorithm that requires O(1) operations on
average to sample from a discrete Gaussian NZ
(
0, σ2
)
.
Algorithm 3 Algorithm for Sampling a Discrete Gaussian
Input: Parameter σ2 > 0.
Output: One sample from NZ
(
0, σ2
)
.
Set t← bσc+ 1
loop . Repeat until successful
Sample Y ← LapZ(t) . Use Algorithm 2
Sample C ← Bernoulli(exp(−(|Y | − σ2/t)2/2σ2)). . Use Algorithm 1
If C = 0, reject and restart.
If C = 1, return Y as output. . Success; Y is a discrete Gaussian.
7Note that this later condition is added to the algorithm to avoid double-counting the probability that Z = 0.
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Proof of Theorem 30. Fix any iteration of the loop, and let t ← bσc + 1 and τ := 1/t. Since
Y ← LapZ(1/τ), we have that C is a Bernoulli with parameter
E [C] = E [E [C | Y ]] = E
[
e−
(|Y |−σ2τ)2
2σ2
]
=
1− e−τ
1 + e−τ
∑
y∈Z
e−
(|y|−σ2τ)2
2σ2
−|y|τ =
1− e−τ
1 + e−τ
e−
σ2τ2
2
∑
y∈Z
e−
y2
2σ2 .
Thus, for any y ∈ Z, conditioned on C = 1 (i.e., on Y being output) we have
P [Y = y | C = 1] = P [C = 1 | Y = y]P [Y = y]
P [C = 1]
=
e−
(|y|−σ2τ)2
2σ2 · 1−e−τ
1+e−τ · e−|y|τ
E [C]
=
e−
(|y|−σ2τ)2
2σ2 · e−|y|τ
e−
σ2τ2
2
∑
y′∈Z e
− y′2
2σ2
=
e−
y2
2σ2∑
y′∈Z e
− y′2
2σ2
.
That is, conditioned on outputting a value, this value is indeed distributed according to NZ
(
0, σ2
)
.
We now turn to the runtime analysis. First, recalling (1) that σ2τ2 < 1 and σ ≥ t− 1, by our
choice of t = 1/τ = bσc + 1 > σ, and (2) the bound ∑y∈Z e− y22σ2 ≥ max{1,√2piσ2} from Fact 17,
we have
E [C] ≥ 1− e
−1/t
1 + e−1/t
e−
1
2 max{1,
√
2piσ} ≥ e
−1/2√2pi
2
(1− e−1/t) max{1, t− 1} > 0.29.
Therefore the probability that the algorithms succeeds and outputs a value in any given iteration of
the loop is lower bounded by a positive constant. Thus the number of iterations of the loop follows
a geometric distribution and is constant in expectation. Since, for each iteration, the expected
number of operations required to sample Y and C is constant (by Propositions 32 and 31) the
overall number of operations is constant in expectation.
Runtime. We have stated that our algorithms require a constant number of operations in expec-
tation. We now elaborate on this.
We assume a Word RAM model of computation. In particular, we assume that arithmetic
operations on the parameters count as one operation. Specifically, we assume that the parameter
σ2 is represented as a rational number (i.e., two integers in binary) and that this fits in a constant
number of words. If we measure complexity in terms of bits (rather than words), then all operations
run in time polynomial in the description length of the input σ2. We emphasize that, if the
parameter σ2 is rational, then all operations are over rational numbers; we only apply basic field
operations and comparisons and do not evaluate any functions like the exponential function or
the square root8 that would require approximations or moving outside the rational field. The
memory (i.e., number of words) used by our algorithms is logarithmic in the runtime and constant
in expectation. (The only way the memory usage grows is the counters associated with some loops.)
The runtime of our algorithms is random. Beyond showing that the number of operations is
constant in expectation, it is possible to show for all of our algorithms that it follows a subexpo-
nential distribution. This because our algorithms effectively consist of a constant number of nested
8We do compute t = b√σ2c + 1 = inf{n ∈ N : n2 > σ2} and count this as a single operation; this can be done
exactly with rational operations (and binary search).
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loops and the number of times each of them runs is bounded by a geometric distribution.9 This
means that, for any δ ∈ (0, 1), to generate k samples from NZ
(
0, σ2
)
(i.e., k runs of Algorithm 3),
the probability of requiring more than O(k + log(1/δ)) operations is at most δ.
Our algorithms have a highly concentrated runtime. This is important: If they do not terminate
in time, then this may result in a failure of differential privacy. There is also the potential for
timing attacks. Balcer and Vadhan [BV17] argue that differentially private algorithms should have
a deterministic running time to avoid these issues altogether. However, this is a highly restrictive
model. We cannot exactly sample the discrete Gaussian (or any unbounded distribution) in this
model. It is not even possible to exactly sample from Bernoulli(1/3) in this model (since, if we only
have access to ` random bits, we can only generate probabilities that are a multiple of 2−`).
By terminating (and outputting 0) after a pre-specified time limit, our algorithms can be made
to have a deterministic runtime. However, this comes at the expense of now only satisfying approx-
imate (ε, δ+ δ′)-differential privacy or δ′-approximate 12ε
2-concentrated differential privacy [BS16],
where δ′ is the probability of reaching the time limit. Since the running time is roughly subexpo-
nential, this failure probability δ′ can be made astronomically small with no cost in accuracy and
very little cost in runtime (i.e., only milliseconds overall). Realistically, a far greater concern than
this failure probability is that the source of random bits is not perfectly uniform.
Practical remark. We have implemented the algorithms from Algorithms 1, 2, and 3 in Python
(using the fractions.Fraction class for exact rational arithmetic and using random.SystemRandom()
to obtain high-quality randomnesss). Overall, on a standard personal computer, our basic (non-
optimized) implementation is able to produce over 1000 samples per second even for σ2 = 10100.
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